A symmetric device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) protocol is proposed in this paper, with Holevo limit and subadditivity of von Neumann entropy, one can bound Eve's ability with collective attack. Together with symmetry of this protocol, the state Eve prepared for Alice and Bob, and at the same time, her eavesdropping on Alice's and Bob's measurements can be definitely inferred at the assumption that Eve aims at maximizing her information gain. The optimal state under this circumstance can be solely bounded with Alice and Bob's statistical results on the quantity of Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) polynomial S, that is, our symmetric DIQKD has the same secure basis as that of Ekert91 protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an art of generating physically secure key between remote partners, the information sender Alice, and the receiver Bob [1] [2] [3] , even if in the presence of a powerful eavesdropper, namely Eve, whose capability is only limited by quantum mechanics. On one hand, the security proof of QKD has been obtained with nearly perfect apparatus [4, 5] . On the other hand, there are different loopholes in current QKD experiments that may injure the security of the final key bits [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . Even with the perfect experimental apparatus [4, 5] , there are also some self-evident assumptions that guarantee the security of final key bits. For instance, we have to assume that Alice and Bob have the freedom to choose the bases for their preparations and measurements. Their classical results which is unwanted to be leaked out should be completely secret. At the same time, Alice and Bob should entirely control their apparatus to generate the raw keys. Or else, the final key bits cannot be secure.
As for commercial application, the apparatuses of Alice and Bob will be black boxes that may be provided by their potential rivals. It is interesting how Alice and Bob can determine the security of their final key bits extracted from these black boxes? Recently, the device-independent QKD (DIQKD) [13] [14] [15] has been suggested to ask for the answer. It was assumed in this protocol that Alice and Bob have no knowledge about their measurement devices. The violation of CHSH inequality will impose restriction on Hilbert space dimension of their measurements to ensure the efficient quantum correlations between Alice and Bob [16, 17] . Secure key bits against collective attack for this protocol has been proven [14, 15] . Its final key generation rate depends on two parameters, the quantity of CHSH polynomial S and the quantum bit error rate (QBER) Q. These two parameters are decided by the state measured by the legitimate users' devices and the way of their measurements at the same time. As Alice and Bob have no idea about the state prepared by Eve, and their measurement devices can also be fabricated by their rivals, generalization from collective attack to general attack is still missed.
The way of state preparation in DIQKD is the same as those of Ekert91 protocol [2] and entanglement-based QKD protocol with sources in the middle [18, 19] where Eve's eavesdropping ability is bounded with collective attack as quantum De Finetti theorem can be applied after Alice and Bob having randomized the measurement sequences on their states [20, 21] . In DIQKD, however, It is impossible for Alice and Bob to make sure that their measurements function exactly on the quantum systems as their expectations. In fact, Eve may devise Alice's and Bob's measurements differently in every run. In this paper, a symmetric DIQKD protocol is proposed. The symmetry of this protocol, together with the Holevo limit [22] [23] [24] , will provide strong confinements on Eve's eavesdropping. We show Eve's information is maximized when all states distributed to Alice and Bob are identically prepared. Then the procedure of uniform their states is completed automatically, and Alice and Bob can estimate their parameters by randomizing the sequences of their classical results. Furthermore, Eve's optimal state when her illegal information is maximized can be solely bounded with Alice and Bob's parameter S. Then our symmetric DIQKD has the same secure basis as that of Ekert91 protocol.
II. A SYMMETRIC DIQKD PROTOCOL
Our DIQKD protocol is symmetric not only because Alice's and Bob's basis choices are symmetric, but also because the statistical results generated from all bases are the same. It works as follows. (1) N EPR pairs emit from the signal source set between Alice's and Bob's labs. One particle of the EPR pair is sent to Alice and the other one is sent to Bob. (2) Both Alice and Bob choose four expecting measurement bases as
As is shown in Fig. 1 ). In each run, Alice will randomly measure the incoming particle in one of the four bases, and so does Bob. Or else, they carry out privacy amplification to generate their secure final key. 
where T r E is the trace on Eve's systems. According to DIQKD protocol, the result in the kth run is T r(A 
states [14, 15, [25] [26] [27] . Furthermore, 
is required for the subadditivity of entropy. With the same procedure, one can have
The equality holds if and only if
T r E (ρ A 1···N B 1···N E ) can be written as N product systems shared between Alice and Bob,
Eve controls the transmission of quantum state, thus she can make ρ k AB optimal for her information gain. As dimH AB ≤ 4, projective measurements can be launched on ρ
The equality holds if and only if ρ
Λ is a diagonal matrix in H, and P is composed with the basis vectors {τ k }. Noticing Bell bases B = {ς l } is also a set of bases in H, there should be a unitary operator U satisfying T = UB. Then one can have Λ = B −1 U −1 ρ k AB UB, which means ρ k AB can be diagonalized in Bell bases after it has been operated as U −1 ρ k AB U. It is apparently that this process will not alter the amount of entanglement on ρ k AB , and Eve's information gain is only determined by the elements of Λ. That is, the assumption that the state ρ k AB can be diagonlized on Bell bases will not affect Eve's information gain, and at the same time, it will not harm Eve's ability to intervene Alice and Bob's communication.
Then it does not loss any generality to assume ρ k AB can be diagonalized on Bell bases so long as both Alice's and Bob's marginal distributions are symmetric [14, 15] .
Suppose the state distributed by Eve in the kth run is σ Bob's N shared systems (This assumption does not loss any generality if these two states are prepared to be the same), they can be denoted as σ
3 ρ |Ψ − . Then Eve's information gain on these states should be represented as 
[mS(σ . Then one can obtain p 1 = p 2 , and
, or
and θ 1 −ϕ 2 = − [28] [29] [30] . This will increase QBER on the key, that is, she will risk to be detected on line without gaining more information. Then for the sake of Eve's optimal information gain, and concealing her existence at the same time, the Hilbert space of x − z coincides with that of x ′ − z ′ , and the states for them are prepared on the same systems correspondingly.
. If the measurement directions between Alice and Bob are well aligned, the QBER can be calculated as p 1 + p 3 .
Or else, it should be written as Q =
, where ϑ is the included angle between these measurement directions. This value is greater than that of the former. Then Alice's measurement bases should keep alignment with those of Bob, one can obtain S = 2
, which is the same as that in [14, 15] . In practical implementation of DIQKD, Alice and Bob can not obtain the value of p. Defining q ≡ p + p 3 , we have q = 1 − S 2 √ 2 = 2Q. But the exact value of p 1 and p 3 is still unknown. As Eve's information on σ AB can be written as ) is satisfied. According to the discussion above,
should also be represented as σ
ρ |Ψ − . Its corresponding S can be calculated to be less than 2
Bob, great S means less information can be obtained Eve, which means S optimal can bound Eve's illegal information. Generally, if the value of CHSH polynomial is S, Eve's illegal information should be less than E(S) = − 1 4
) log 2 (
). Thus, DIQKD can be bounded with the quantity of CHSH polynomial, which means it has the same secure basis as that of Ekert91 protocol [2] . For collective attack, Alice and Bob's key generation can be represented as
where
is the Shannon entropy and χ is the Holevo limit [34, 35] . In our symmetric DIQKD, the lower bound of Alice and Bob's key generation rate can be estimated as
is satisfied, the key rate of our DIQKD can be calculated as
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, a symmetric DIQKD has been proposed, where Eve's ability of eavesdropping can be bounded with collective attack. That is, generalization on the security of DIQKD from collective attack to general attack can be realized. Its security can be estimated similarly as that of Ekert91 protocol, that is, determined by the quantity of CHSH polynomial S. However, we have only considered an ideal case where the loss in the quantum channel is not added in. In practical implementation of this protocol, there may be detecting loophole because of imperfectly detecting efficiency [32, 33] . Especially, faking state attack has been proposed to eavesdrop on DIQKD protocols with inefficient measurement devices [36] . To make DIQKD more practically with present devices, however, proposition for experimental realization of this protocol has been given [37] . satisfy the relationship
where ρ i is the state functions with Alice and Bob's measurements in the ith run. This conclusion can easily be proven with Klein's inequality S(ρ) ≤ −T r(ρ log 2 σ). Defining
ρ i , and substituting them into the Klein's inequality, we have
The equality holds if and only if the state can be written as product states of n systems.
Appendix B: Diagonalizing ρ AB on Bell bases
Suppose P i is a complete set of orthogonal projectors and ρ is a density operator. Then the entropy of the state σ ≡ i P i ρP i of the system after the measurement is at least as greater as the original entropy
This results can be verified easily with Klein's inequality.
If P i s are the set of projective operators which can maximize Eve's information after it has functioned on state ρ. Writing P i as τ i τ † i , then T = {τ i } is the basis of the Hilbert space of ρ, and ρ is diagonal in basis T = {τ i }. Then σ is the diagonalized density matrix of ρ on basis T = {τ i }. Now we will show ρ can be diagonalized in any other set of bases of the Hilbert space of ρ. If Q i s are another set of projective operators in this Hilbert space, and Q i = ς i ς † , V = {ς i }s are also orthogonal bases of the Hilbert space of ρ. Similarly, we can define matrix Q constituting of bases V = {ς i }, then there exists a unitary matrix U, with which the relationship P = UQ can be satisfied. We can rewrite density matrix σ as σ = Q −1 U −1 ρUQ. (1) When m = 1, all states are identical.
(2) When m = 2, they are denoted as ρ
And their statistical representation of all systems can be written as ρ AB = (1 − p)ρ |Φ + + p 1 ρ |Φ − + p 2 ρ |Ψ + + p 3 ρ |Ψ − . These two types of states are assumed to be prepared equiprobably, and this assumption does not loss any generality if these two types of states can be proven to be the same. Then Eve's information gain on these states should be less than 
